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There is an ongoing debate about the "ontology" of consent.  Some argue that it is a mental 
act, some that it is a "hybrid" of a mental act plus behaviour that signifies that act;  others 
argue that consent  is a performative, akin to promising or commanding.  Here it is argued 
that all these views are mistaken—though some more so than others.  We begin with the 
question whether a normatively efficacious act of consent can be completed in the mind 
alone.  Standard objections to this "mentalist" account of consent can be rebutted.  Here we 
identify a much deeper problem for mentalism.  Normatively transformative acts of  consent 
change others' reasons for acting in a distinctive—"robust"—way.  Robust reason-changing 
involves acts aimed at fulfilling a distinctive kind of reflexive and recognition-directed 
intention.  Such acts cannot be coherently performed in the mind alone.  Consent is not a 
mental act, but nor is it the signification of such an act.  Acts of consent cannot be 
"completed" in the mind, and it is a mistake to view consent behaviour as making known a 
completed act of consent.  The robust reason-changing account of consent developed here 
shares something with the performative theory, but is not saddled with a label whose home is 
philosophy of language. Certain kinds of performative utterance may change reasons 
robustly, but not all robust reason-changing involves or requires acts of speech, and consent 










Adult individuals can render permissible, by acts of consent, actions that would otherwise be 
impermissible.  There is a debate about what kind of thing consent must be, if it is to bring 
about this kind of normative change.  One view—mentalism—is that performing the 
appropriate kind of mental act is not just necessary but also sufficient to bring about the 
normative change distinctive of permissive consent (Hurd 1996; Alexander 1996; Husak 
2006; Alexander 2014; Dsouza 2013).
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 Here our focus will be upon the sufficiency claim: 
can a merely mental act be sufficient for the kind or normative change that consent brings 
about?  
 
Mentalism may seem obviously false and not to need refutation: how can performing an act 
in the mind directly change other people's reasons for acting?  However, there are arguments 
in favour of it, and a rejection of mentalism is not as straightforward as it may seem. The 
arguments standardly offered against mentalism fail to acknowledge the distinctive 
assumptions which motivate and sustain mentalism.  But mentalism is false, and the aim here 
is to show why.  The mentalist has to accept that consent is typically made via intentional, 
overt, behavioural acts, and thus has to have something to say about the relationship between 
the normatively efficacious mental acts and overt consent behaviour. Mentalism views such 
behavioural acts as playing a primarily epistemic role: that of making known, to relevant 
others, that the normatively transformative mental act has been made.  However, by reflecting 
                                                          
1
 Peter Westen (2004) may seem to be an advocate of mentalism in that he holds that consent is a mental state of 
factual acquiesence, but Westen does not hold that the mental state of consent, so conceived, is thereby 
normatively transformative.  Our focus here is upon the view that a mental act by itself can constitute 
normatively transformative consent. 
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on the distinctive way that the exercise of normative powers changes other parties' reasons 
for acting—robust reason-changing—we see that this assumption about the role of consent 
behaviour is misguided.
2
  Overt behavioural acts of consent are not aimed at making known 
an act of consent that has already been "completed" in the mind.  Such acts are aimed at 
fulfilling a distinctive kind of reflexive, recognition-directed, intention.  The robust reason-
changing nature of consent implies that acts of consent cannot be effected in the mind alone.  
The argument offered here also applies to the view that consent is a "hybrid" of some kind of 
mental act plus some further act which signifies, expresses or communicates that act.   
 
1. Mental necessity 
 
Our focus is upon permissive consent, rather than, say, consent as agreement, or consent to be 
bound by terms of a contract.  Our focus will also be restricted to individual consent, rather 
than permission given by institutions, collectives or groups.  Permissive consent of this kind 
is operative against a backdrop of conditional norms of the form: S may not do X, unless R 
consents.  R’s act of consent renders the doing of X permissible for S.  Permissive consent is 
operative with regard to different kinds of norms: moral norms; legal norms; social norms, 
norms of politeness, and norms established by contract, or agreement, for example.  Here our 
focus will primarily be on consent as morally transformative.  
 
There are a number of reasons to hold that certain kinds of mental element, including mental 
acts, are necessary for normatively transformative consent.   
 
1.1 Discretionary powers and the normative significance of choice 
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The power to permit by consent is a discretionary one.  It is up to the agent herself whether to 
exercise her power, or not.  She may do so on a whim, or for cruel selfish reasons, or against 
her own best interests.  To whom the individual gives consent, and for what  is also up to the 
individual herself. Not only is consent essentially mind-involving because it is 
discretionary—and thus requires a decision on the part of the consentor—it is arguable that 
the reason why individuals have a discretionary power—in whatever normative context 
consent is operative—is that choice has a normative significance (in that context).  For 
example, in the moral realm it is arguable that we have a discretionary power to permit by 
consent because we have a fundamental interest in being able to decide whether, when, and 
for whom, to create an exception to certain of our moral rights (Scanlon 1988; Owens 2011).  
Thus, in many moral consent domains—such as medical treatment and research, and sexual 
contact—the power to permit by consent is explicitly justified by an appeal to respect for 
autonomy (Childress 2012).
3
  To perform a medical intervention, or engage in medical 
research, without consent is to fail to respect the patient, or research subject, as an 
autonomous person, capable of making her own decisions about what to do, or what is to be 
done to her.
 4
  Similarly, theories of what makes non-consensual sex morally wrong make 
appeal to our rights as individuals to autonomously decide who is permitted to make certain 
kinds of contact with us (McGregor 2005; Archard 2007).   
 
1.2 Content and Normative Scope 
 
                                                          
3
 There is considerable disagreement about the importance of autonomous choice for normatively transformative 
consent (Manson and O'Neill 2007; Miller and Wertheimer 2010; Walker 2013). 
4
 Thus Hurd (1996) argues: ‘autonomy resides in the ability to will the alteration of moral rights and duties, and 
if consent is normatively significant precisely because it constitutes an “expression of autonomy" then consent 
must constitute the "exercise of the will’ pp. 124-5. 
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Consent is directed at certain kinds of action, and certain agents.  It is (typically) directed at 
acts that have not yet been performed.
5
  The acts to which consent is directed need not 
actually be performed.  But there is nothing odd about this relationship to not-yet-performed 
actions once we acknowledge that consent has an essential mental component: consent can be 
directed at acts that are never performed just as intentions to act do not entail the performance 
of the act.   
 
Not only do acts of consent have an intentional content—of the form S may do X (where S 
can be an agent, or set of agents, and X a type of action)—acts of consent have a normative 
scope.  Consider social norms of politeness.  S asks R if she may take the vacant seat on the 
train beside R.  If R consents (leaving aside for now exactly what it is that R must do), her 
consent pertains to S, and to the action of taking the seat.  It does not cover T’s taking the 
seat, or S’s borrowing R’s newspaper.  The same point is true in other normative contexts.  If 
R consents to S taking her vintage motorbike,  if T then does so (without consent being 
directed at T), then T wrongs R.  Similarly, if S takes R’s prize collection of cutlery, she 
wrongs R.  In each case the act of consent only renders permissible some actions for some 
agents.  The content of an act of consent is related to, but not the same thing as, its normative 
scope.  The content of an act of consent is what it would permit, provided that certain 
conditions are met and it is not undermined by “defeating” conditions.  The normative force 
of an act of consent—whose intentional consent is that S may do X—can be defeated, such 
that even though the act is made, the result is not that S may do X. 
 
1.3 The contrast between transformative and inert acts of consent 
  
                                                          
5
 Some consent is concurrent, and there is a debate about whether the idea of antecedent or “subsequent” 




Focusing on the defeating conditions for consent gives us another line of support for the 
claim that certain kinds of mental act are necessary for normatively efficacious consent.  
Consider the contrast between the normatively transformative PERMISSION and the two 
normatively inert examples that follow it: 
 
PERMISSION:  S asks R if S may kiss R’s hand.  R nods and offers her hand to S. 
THREAT:  S tells R that if she does not let him kiss her hand he will kill her. R takes S’s 
threat to be credible. R nods and offers her hand to S. 
IMPERSONATION: S impersonates R’s lover T.  Pretending to be T, S asks to kiss R’s 
hand.  R thinks that it is T is asking.  R nods andoffers her hand to S (believing him to be T). 
 
The latter two examples are ones where R performs the same type of behaviour—offering her 
hand to S—as she does in the permissive case, but, intuitively, in the latter two situations the 
act performed does not bring about normative change.  Such an act is normatively inert, at 
least with regard to the kinds of normative change distinctive of consent 
 
There are different ways that we might explain this contrast, but one plausible way is that in 
the inert cases R lacks the right mental state, or fails to perform the right mental act: that is, 
the kind of mental act, with the content necessary for normative change.  
 
What kind of mental state or act?  This is a question that we will answer in more detail below.  
Let us first consider what mentalists assume about the kind of mental state that is necessary—
and, in their view, sufficient—for normatively transformative consent.  Heidi Hurd, argues 





  This may seem to have some plausibility.  In THREAT and IMPERSONATION 
R does not intend that the action that is in fact performed, be performed.  But there are two 
problems with this line of thought.  First, one can permit an action without intending that it be 
performed.  Consent can be given reluctantly, as the "least bad" option from a poor set of 
options.  Second, the very idea of intending someone else’s actions is puzzling: R can hope 
that S kisses her hand, or wish that he would, but she cannot directly intend that he does so 
(Alexander 2014).  Larry Alexander offers a more  plausible candidate: 
 
The mental state that I believe constitutes consent is that of waiving one's right to 
object, or, if that sounds too much like a non-mental action, that of mentally 
accepting without objection another's crossing one's moral or legal boundary (the 
boundary that defines one's rights. (Alexander 2014: 7) 
 
Although Alexander talks of the “mental state” of consent, he is clear that consent is an act, 
not some state, condition or disposition. Consent is not some kind of state that might befall 
the consentor.
7
  In the normatively inert examples above, R does not mentally waive her 
rights against S doing the action in question, even though she behaves as if she does.   
2.  Mental  sufficiency 
 
Suppose we accept that certain kinds of mental act are necessary for normatively 
transformative consent, can a mental act be sufficient for normative change?  Hurd (1996) 
asks us to consider an example of a severely disabled person incapable of communicating by 
any means.  Hurd argues that such a person can still give normatively transformative consent 
even though nobody can ever know that she has done so.  An example like this might seem to 
provide a simple reductio of mentalism: even if such a person were to mentally accept 
                                                          
6
 Hurd’s (1996) formulation is more complex than this, in order to resolve certain issues about the scope of an 
act of consent, but, at root, it is an intention directed towards the act to be performed. 
7
 E.g., the “feeling of willingness” identified by Hickman and Muehlenhard (1999). 
 8 
 
another party's “boundary crossing”, it would still surely be wrong for that person to attempt 
sexual contact with her? But mentalists argue that such an intuition is mistaken.  Mentalists 
have drawn an analogy with the legal notion of abandonment where one's change of mind can 
make a normative difference without being communicated (Dsouza 2103; Alexander 2014).  
For example, suppose R has  left her bag at the airport.  She cannot be bothered to return to 
get it so decides to abandon it. Although R's  mental abandonment has not been 
communicated to anyone, someone who takes the bag—after the decision to abandon has 
been made—does not wrong the R. In the same way, the mentalist argues, it is what one has 
in mind, with regards to one’s rights against, say, bodily touching, that makes the moral 
difference.  Here, normative change tracks the intentions and decisions, not facts about 
whether those mental changes are communicated to others. 
 
But this analogy is weak.  Abandonment is more like abrogation—the foregoing or 
deactivating of a right in general.  The change effected by abrogation is a broad, nonspecific 
one.  But consent is not abrogation. Consent has a specific intentional content and a 
normative scope.  The purpose and function of consent is to make a normative difference to 
the status of some actions for some agents (at a certain time, for a certain purpose, and so on).  
Consent changes other, specific, agents' reasons for acting (or for refraining from acting) in 
certain specific ways.  As Wertheimer puts it: ‘If we ask what could change A’s reasons for 
action, the answer must be that B performs some [explicit behavioural] token of consent. It is 
hard to see how B’s mental state – by itself – can do the job’ (Wertheimer 2003: 146). 8 
But the mentalist has two responses here (Alexander 2014).  First, we need to keep apart two 
different normative questions: first does S breach the norm in question?  Is S culpable?  In 
                                                          
8
 In a similar vein Govert den Hertogh  (2011) suggests ‘consenting in the relevant sense should be seen, not as 
a mental but as a public act, a ‘performative’, which by itself has the effect of changing other people’s 
normative status, their reasons to act or to refrain from acting’. (p. 301). A similar point is made by Joel 
Feinberg (1986), p.183. 
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the moral case, this comes down to the contrast between S wronging R, and S being 
blameworthy.  Culpability and blameworthiness exhibit a distinctive kind of epistemic 
dependency.  Such statuses are determined by what S reasonably believes about R’s consent.  
In contrast, facts about whether or not a norm is breached, or whether or not S wrongs R are 
fixed by R’s mental acts alone.  Suppose S has no evidence that R has consented to his doing 
X, S is blameworthy if he does X, even if in fact R has consented.  
 
Second, in response to the objection that the function of consent is essentially social, and that 
it changes other parties’ reasons for acting, the mentalist can argue that we need to keep apart 
practical but non-normative aspects of consent transactions, from the properly normative 
aspects of those transactions.  Consider a patient consenting to treatment: it is prudential that 
she communicate her (mental act of) consent if she wants to surgeon to know that she has 
consented, but the thing that does the normative work, is her decision to forego her objection, 
not its communication.   
 
The argument for mentalism thus has two strands.  First, there are the considerations—
outlined above—in favour of holding that a certain kind of mental act is necessary for 
normatively transformative consent.  Second, the mentalist argues that we do not need to 
make an appeal to anything else.  The mentalist does not deny that consent typically will have 
a “public face”, nor do they deny that public acts are of great importance in consent 
transactions.  But this is because, the mentalist suggests, overt behaviour plays an epistemic 
role: that of signifying to others that the appropriate act has been made.  Consent behaviour is 
of epistemic and practical importance because it allows relevant others to know of the 
consentor's mental acts, but epistemic and practical importance is not the same thing as 




In sum, certain direct and intuitive lines of objection against mentalism are not conclusive.  It 
does not follow from this that mentalism is correct, only that the arguments deployed against 
it so far are inconclusive.  In the remainder of this paper a stronger case against mentalism is 
developed. 
 
3.  Mentalism and “deceptive” acts of consent 
Mentalism has to accept—as a brute matter of fact—that normatively transformative consent 
is typically effected via overt behaviour, verbal or otherwise.  Because the mentalist holds 
that certain mental acts are sufficient for normative change the mentalist is committed to: 
 
COMPLETENESS THESIS: the change in normative status distinctive of consent—
rendering another’s action morally permissible—is completed by an act within the 
consentor's mind. 
 
On the mentalist theory, normative change is brought about in the mind and overt behaviour 
plays an epistemic and practical role.  It allows the consentor to make known her private 
mental act to others and this can be of considerable practical importance.  Suppose R wants to 
receive surgical treatment but knows that surgery is prohibited without consent.  Surgeon S 
will not treat her unless S has reason to believe that R has changed the normative situation.  
R's rights of bodily integrity pose an obstacle to her own treatment, so it is prudential to 
communicate her mental act of consent to S.  
 
Mental acts are not self-broadcasting: a mental act of consent need not be made known.  
Relatedly, we can engage in the kind of behaviour that would be taken by others to be an 
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expression of consent—including paradigmatic consent behaviour like saying "I consent"—
without having made the appropriate mental act.  Mentalism is thus committed to: 
 
INDEPENDENCE THESIS: there is a logical independence between consent behaviour and 
the normatively efficacious acts of consent.  The behavioural act could be made without the 
accompanying (mental) normatively efficacious act, and the normatively transformative 
mental act could be performed without the behavioural act.   
 
If the completeness and independence theses are correct, it should be possible for an agent to 
engage in an insincere acts of consent where the overt behaviour does not correspond to, or 
reflect, the underlying mental act.  For example: 
 
BOSS: R has just bought a vintage Triumph Bonneville motorcycle.  She believes it to be 
non-working.  R’s boss S hears that R has a new motorcycle (and, having no evidence 
otherwise, believes that it is fully functional).  S  asks if she may come round to take it for a 
ride.  If the bike were working R would not permit S to take it for a ride.  She does not forego 
her objection to S’s riding it, because, in her view, it will not be ridden: there is no need to 
forego her objection.  However, in order to gain favour with S, R  says “Sure, no problem, 
why not come round this afternoon and take it for a spin” (planning to feign surprise when 
the bike does not start). Unbeknownst to R, the Bonneville is in working order.  S visits, 
starts the vintage bike, and takes it for a ride. 
 





                                                          
9
 The completeness thesis by itself does not tell us a great deal about the absence of consent, and even less about 
the nature of refusals. 
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SUITOR:  R very much wants suitor S to kiss her hand.  She has decided in her mind to 
forego any objection to S's doing so.  S approaches R and asks to kiss her hand.  R then 
notices that they are being watched by another, much wealthier, suitor T.  R does not want T 
to lose interest, and, though she still foregoes her objection to S kissing her hand, she does 
not want T to know this, so she explicitly says to S, in front of T “No, you may not”.  She 
intends to reveal the truth about her mental act of foregoing her objection to S shortly,  when 
T is out of earshot.  However, S impetuously takes R’s hand and kisses it anyway. 
 
Let us assume that in each example R makes her utterance freely.  She is not coerced into her 
utterance, nor is her utterance misdirected by deception. Also, let us suppose, R makes her 
utterance with the intention that others (falsely) believe that she intends to change the 
normative situation (as in BOSS) or that she intends that others (falsely) believe that she 
intends to maintain the normative status quo (as in SUITOR).  If R freely and knowingly acts 
in a way that aims at bringing it about that others believe that she intends to permit S to do X, 
it is hard to see how S wrongs R, if S acts in accordance with her freely offered act of 
consent.  If R makes an explicit refusal and S goes against it, S surely wrongs R, even if, in 
R's mind, she has foregone her objection.  This is not mere blameworthiness.  To go against 
someone's explicit refusal wrongs them, and fails to respect them as another agent with the 
power to determine whether or not it is permissible for another to touch her.   
 
Mentalism, however, gives us the opposite answer.  In BOSS, R has not mentally waived her 
rights, she is only deliberately and freely acting in a way that seeks to induce the false belief 
that she consents to the taking of the bike.  In SUITOR R does forego her objection in her 
mind, but decides to induce the false belief that she refuses to permit S to kiss her.  In these 
examples we have two candidate acts of consent (or refusal) in play.  We have R’s explicit 
act, and her mental act.  The freely made, intentional, explicit act seems to be a better 




Many people may share the anti-mentalist intuition here.  But the mentalist may not.  Indeed, 
a reviewer of this paper argues that the mentalist can deal with both SUITOR and BOSS.  
First, in SUITOR if we assume mentalism, then R does consent, but S does not know this. S 
is blameworthy, but the facts of the matter are such that S does not in fact wrong R.  So 
SUITOR by itself does not show mentalism to be false.  Second, in in BOSS the mentalist 
can agree with the intuitive judgement that R does permit S to take the motorbike whilst 
insisting that this is consistent with mentalism.  R does consent, but consents conditionally: R 
consents to S’s taking the motorbike if (but only if) it is working.  This is no different, so the 
objection goes, to someone who bets on a racehorse on the (false) assurance that it will win.  
If it loses, R has no complaint, because R took a gamble, and this is the situation in BOSS.   
 
Part of the mentalist objection to BOSS is that R actually does consent in her mind, and that 
is why our intuitions are that the insincere performance changes the normative situation.  The 
idea of a conditional consent is meant to achieve this.  But it is not at all clear that the consent 
given in BOSS is conditional, especially if we fix upon the consentor’s intentions.  We can 
bolster up the example a little.  Suppose R has herself disabled the motorbike precisely in 
order to execute her insincere “pandering” act of consent.  It would be very odd to 
characterize her intention (on the mentalist view) as “I set aside my objection to the 
motorbike being used if  it is working”.  This would be a rationally odd thing to entertain.  
Indeed, the pandering strategy used by R is based on the assumption that the motorbike is not 
working.   
 
But doesn’t this make it just like a gamble?  However, if we take the analogy with gambling 
seriously this seems to underscore the anti-mentalist intuitions rather than support mentalism.  
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Suppose R makes an insincere bet, we don’t hold that she is thereby exempt from the 
obligations incurred when the bet is lost.  On the flipside, suppose R bets on a horse mentally 
but without the public commitment.  We don’t hold that the normative situation is changed by 
doing so.  Normative change tracks the performance, not what the agent has in mind, and, 
importantly, a mental bet is not yet a bet.   
 
Finally, it is important to stress that the substantive case against mentalism is not solely 
grounded in our intuitions about these two examples.  Rather than letting intuitions do the 
work, our case against mentalism will be stronger if we can offer an alternative, 
independently justified, account of the nature of consent which shows why mentalism is 
wrong and also explains why it is R's overt action in BOSS that is normatively 
transformative.  
 
4.  Performatives and robust reason-changing 
 
One alternative to mentalism is that consent is a performative (Wertheimer 1999; den 
Hertogh 2011). On this view, consent is but one member of a wide family of normatively 
transformative performatives like promises, vows, prohibitions, and commands, where an 
agent can change the normative situation just by making the appropriate kind of speech act in 
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 A qualification is in order.  Here our focus is on acts of consent, and the debate about whether a mental act 
can constitute a normatively efficacious act of consent.  Elsewhere I distinguish acts of consent from what I call 
consent-in-acting (if R intentionally touches S, R sets aside her objection to S being in bodily contact with her, 
she consents to the contact, but without performing an act of consent).  For our current purposes, it is sufficient 




A performative conception of consent has some considerations in its favour, but also some 
against it.  In its favour, some acts of consent readily pass a simple test for performativity.  A 
test for whether a verb is a performative one—that is, that it has at least some performative 
uses—is that it can, in some uses, be prefixed with ‘hereby’ (Austin 1962: 57).  The ‘hereby’ 
draws attention to the performative nature of the utterance.  “I hereby F” draws attention to 
the fact that the speaker is intending, by her utterance, to bring it about that she Fs, in virtue 
of its being recognised as intending to do so
 
(Searle 1989).  Consent readily passes the 
‘hereby’ test.11 So, in at least some cases—when prefixed with hereby—consent is a 
performative.  
 
But a performative theory of consent seems to be very limited in its scope.  The bulk of 
everyday consent transactions do not use "hereby" and very many everyday consent 
transactions do not explicitly use a consent verb at all.  Alexander sees such a fact as ruling 
out the performative theory: he argues that consent cannot be a performative because ‘there is 
no canonical form of words or action that count as consent’ (Alexander 2014: 2). 
 
One problem with a performative theory of consent is that it saddles itself with a concept—
performative—whose roots lie in philosophy of language.  This ties the concept to the 
interests of philosophers of language.  Searle (1989), for example, claims that the notion of 
performative is restricted to those illocutionary acts that are "performed by uttering a 
sentence containing an expression that names the type of speech act, as in for example, "I 
order you to leave the room." (p. 537).  Searle may delineate a category of utterances of 
philosophical interest, but on Searle's conception of performative, consent would rarely be a 
performative.  But our interests in formulating a theory of consent are not the same as those 
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 A quick non-scholarly test: Google search for “I hereby consent” has over 300, 000 hits.  “I hereby promise” 
(which might seem to be a paradigmatic example of performative) only has just over 40,000 hits. [Search March 
2015].   
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of philosophers of language with an interest in a taxonomy of speech act verbs.  Our interest 
is in how agents change the normative situation by their acts, and with the question of what 
kind of act it is that changes the situation in that way.   
 
Consider Searle's example of an order.  An order changes the normative situation by 
imposing, or generating, an obligation on the ordered party.  There are different ways that an 
order can be effected.  Suppose one agent R, has the authority to order another S.  She can 
make the order in a variety of ways. For example: 
 
(i) "I hereby, by the power invested in me by the King, order you to leave" 
(ii) "I hereby order you to leave" 
(iii) "I order you to leave" 
(iv) "Leave! Now!" 
(v)  R waves her hand in a dismissive gesture, intending to order S to leave the room. 
 
Only (i)-(iii) are performatives in Searle's sense, but our concern is with a broader category—
that of acts which bring about changes in the normative situation.  This broader category 
includes all of (i)-(v) above. 
 
Let us stick with orders (or commands) for a moment.
12
  A command gives the commanded 
party a reason to act: commands are a species of reason-giving act.  But there are different 
ways that one person can bring about a change to another party's reasons for acting (or for 
refraining from acting).  Suppose S and R are walking together. S is holding up an umbrella.  
R tells S that the rain has stopped.  S now has a reason to take down her umbrella,  but not 
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 There are differences between orders and commands.  Our discussion is framed in terms of commands to 
align with, and draw upon Enoch's (2011; 2014)  very useful account of reason-giving in commands.  
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because R has given S reasons.  R's act merely plays the role of “triggering”—in Enoch’s 
words—a reason that S already has.  Given that S has reasons (independently of R’s saying 
so) to let down her umbrella if the rain has stopped, R’s act of speech simply triggers this 
reason by making it known.   
 
In contrast, performatives like commands involve what Enoch calls robust reason giving.  
Although robust reason giving is, at root, a species of triggering reason, it has some 
distinctive features.  First, robust reason giving is essentially intentional. Suppose S tells T “It 
is has stopped raining”, but is (unbeknownst to S) overheard by R.  S does not intend to give 
R a reason, but does so inadvertently.  Robust reason-giving essentially involves the intention 
to give another party reasons.  If Colonel R, who has the authority to order troops to attack, 
unwittingly presses "send" on a prepared message "attack now", no order is given, though 
one will seem to be given (and the troops who act upon it are not blameworthy).   
 
Merely having the intention to give another person reasons to act, and getting them act as one 
intends, is not sufficient for robust reason giving..  To adapt one of Enoch’s examples: 
suppose R is the son of a military dictator, but not a military officer himself: he has no formal 
authority over soldier S.  Suppose R “orders” S to “attack the homes and villages”.  Suppose 
S rightly fears what R’s father might do if S does not comply.  Here R intends to give S a 
reason to attack the villages, but R has no power—has no military authority—to directly give 
S a duty.  R is simply trading upon other reasons that S has (to avoid the ire of the dictator).  
This is really a species of threat, not command. 
 
In contrast, when Colonel R, with authority over S, orders S to attack, R intends to put S 
under a duty by making some kind of act—e.g. saying “Attack the homes and villages”—and 
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R intends that S be under that duty just in virtue of S’s recognising that R’s utterance is 
intended to have this effect.  Orders and commands involve a distinctive kind of reflexive and 
recognition-directed intention.   
(i) R intends to give S a reason to φ, and R communicates this intention to S; 
(ii) R intends S to recognize this intention; 
(iii) R intends S’s given reason to φ to depend in an appropriate way on S’s 
recognition of R’s communicated intention to give S a reason to φ (Enoch 2012: 
13). 
Enoch's focus is upon explicit commands, and it is for that reason that he frames things in 
terms of "communicating" the relevant intention.  But commands, as we have noted, can be 
given by a wave of the hand, or a nod.  This fact points us towards two distinctive features of 
robust reason-giving.   
First, the act by which the reason is given is in a broad sense arbitrary relative to the kinds of 
reason that are given.  Let us clarify this.  Consider a non-robust "triggering" reason.  
Suppose R steps out in front of S's motorbike, R's action gives S reasons to brake.  R's act 
triggers a background reason (e.g., a reason to refrain from injuring others on the road).  The 
reasons that are triggered are very tightly tied to the kind of act that R performs. In contrast, 
when R orders S to do something, there is no intrinsic connection between the act by which 
the order is effected—speaking, waving, nodding, writing, shouting—and the reasons that are 
given.  This reflects a kind of arbitrariness that is present in communication more generally.  
For example, suppose Colonel R has agreed that the order to attack will be given by a coded 
phrase to deceive any enemy spies.  R says "The sun is out in Florida".  What matters is that 
when R makes this utterance—what makes it a command—is that in that context R performs 
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an act aimed at fulfilling distinctive reflexive, recognition-directed intention outlined above.  
The arbitrariness here is not absolute.  The command has a content and is issued in a context.  
The act performed has to be of a type that is appropriate to fulfil the intention to put others 
under an order to do X (rather than Y, say) in that communicative context.  But R will know 
that there are many different ways of doing this, and, which one is chosen will depend upon 
other factors (time, formality, pragmatic elements, what R takes S to already know; epistemic 
elements (what will S be able to recognise), and so on).   
 
The second point about performatives of this kind, whether verbal or nonverbal, is that part of 
the commanding agent’s reasons for engaging in that act is to aim to change the normative 
situation.  If we ask why R says "Attack!" or "The Sun it out in Florida"  part of R's reason for 
doing so is precisely to change the normative situation.  R, of course, may have other reasons 
(to impress a senior, to end the conflict, and so on).  In contrast in our “crossing the road” 
triggering-reason type of case, R may trigger S's reason unintentionally (indeed, in the 
example, R is unaware of S's presence),  R is not crossing the road in order to trigger a 
reason.  This is linked to the relatively arbitrary nature of robust-reason giving acts.  If the 
aim is to fulfil an intention to change the normative situation via others' recognition of that 
intention, the type of act one performs is context-sensitive, and, in that context, there may be 




5.  Objections and replies 
At this point a mentalist about consent may wonder what relevance our discussion is to 
consent.  The mentalist may argue that commands put another party under an obligation, 
                                                          
13
 Joseph Raz (1975) makes this point about the exercise of legal powers in the following way: ' most legal 
powers are exercised by acts with only negligible non-normative consequences, like signing, so that there are 
few reasons for or against doing them apart from their legal or other normative consequences'  (p. 103). 
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whilst consent involves the setting aside of an obligation.  It is because they put others under 
an obligation that commands have to be communicated, but consent does not.   
But now consider the fact that in many contexts, commands are revocable.  Suppose R issues 
the command “Attack the villages” but then, a few minutes later (on the basis of a new 
strategy, say) says “Stop! Cease the attack”.  The question now is: how does this utterance 
change subordinate  S’s reasons?  It would be odd if the command were robust, but the 
revocation were not.  When R revokes the order, R intends to change S's reasons via an act 
that aims at fulfilling a variant on the distinctive reflexive and recognition-dependent 
intention noted earlier. 
(i) R intends to change S’s reason to φ, 
(ii) R intends S to recognize this intention; 
(iii) R intends the change in S’s reason to φ to depend in an appropriate way on 
S’s recognition of R’s intention to change S’s reason to φ. 
(iv) R performs an act X which aims to fulfil the intentions in (i)-(iii). 
This broader schema covers not just robust reason-giving, but robust reason-changing.  The 
revocation of a command involves R setting aside an obligation that S  has via the 
performance of the appropriate act with the relevant intention.  But, structurally, this is 
exactly what goes on with consent.
14
  By the act of consent, R intends to set aside S’s reasons 
to refrain from acting in certain ways via S’s recognition that R intends to do so.   
The mentalist might now object that consent is not an authoritative form of reason-changing 
and is thus not robust.  We can concede that the kind of authority that people have in giving 
                                                          
14
 Note also that in many normative contexts (but not all) permissive consent is revocable (Dougherty 2014). 
This means that the consenting party has the power to put another under an obligation that, prior to the act, she 
was not under. This means that the person with the power to revoke consent has a power analogous to 
command. A robust reason changing account can explain this analogy between the two powers. 
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consent is not the same as the institutional authority that a colonel has, say.  But the notion of 
authority that matters here is that which is tied to normative powers, not to this or that 
specific institutional implementation or grounding of those powers.  The reason-changing that 
matters to us is that, in consent, R has the power, just in virtue of performing the appropriate 
kind of act (and it need not be a verbal act, let alone one that deploys the word "consent" or "I 
hereby consent") with the requisite intentions (and no defeating conditions) that other parties 
reasons are thereby changed, just because the person has intended to do so.  There are of 
course further questions as to why the individual should have such an authority to change the 
normative situation, but our focus is on the way that the normative situation is changed, not in 
its fundamental grounding.  That consent has a distinctive kind of authority can be illustrated 
by a fictitious example where it fails to be respected: 
CONSENT WITHOUT AUTHORITY  R's surgeon S proposes surgery to R, seeking her 
consent.  R explicitly gives her permission (via a signed consent form).  S then says "Thank 
you for that, I shall take that information into account in my deliberation about whether it is 
permissible to treat you." 
This example should seem odd.  This is because (medical) consent transactions involve a 
distinctive kind of respect for the consenting party.
15
  When a competent adult patient 
consents or refuses, that is, as it were, the last word.  The patient has the final say about 
whether to create an exception to her rights of bodily integrity.  This kind of respect is a 
reflection of the authority of consent, something that is analogous to the authority to revoke a 
command.  
The mentalist might now object that although consent is authoritative in some sense, the 
reason why we ought to take the consentor's word as final is because of her first-person 
epistemic authority with regard to her mental acts.  This would maintain a commitment to the 




completeness and independence theses noted earlier.  But such an objection fails to engage 
with the robust reason-changing nature of consent.  An act of consent involves the consentor 
acting in a way that aims at fulfilling a recognition-directed intention.  But how can an agent 
seek, by doing some act X, to fulfil her intention that another party change her reasons  via 
that other party’s recognition of that act, if the act in question is entirely mental?  How can R 
intend that S recognise act X as having some kind of status if R does not do anything that 
would put S in a position to recognise it?  It is no good here for a mentalist to argue that 
consent needs to be communicated for prudential or practical reasons.  The point here is that 
the agent cannot complete an  act of consent  in her mind at all.  She can have the intentions 
that another change her reasons,  but unless and until she acts in such a way that is aimed at 
another party recognising such acts as fulfilling the appropriate intentions, an act of consent 
has not been made.  The robust reason-changing nature of acts of consent is at odds with both 
the completeness and independence theses. 
The mentalist might object at this point that the robust reason-changing theory mistakenly 
ties normatively transformative acts of consent to their being recognised by others, or their 
being known by others.  But that would be to misrepresent the theory offered here.  The 
robust reason-changing account holds that there is a difference between performing a 
normatively transformative act of consent and others knowing of it.  R can permit S to do X 
without S ever knowing that she has done so.  But  the robust reason-changing account 
accommodates this fact readily.  For example, suppose R leaves a note permitting S to 
borrow her motorbike “Feel free to take the Bonneville for a spin”.  Suppose S never sees the 
note. The act of consent—the change in the normative situation—is made  when R performs 
the appropriate act with the aim of fulfilling the appropriate intention, whether or not S comes 
to know of that act, is another thing. If S takes the bike without reading the note, she is 
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blameworthy, but does not wrong R.  None of this implies that consent—or command for that 
matter—is the kind of act that can be performed within the mind alone.   
The robust reason-changing account holds that acts of consent—like other robust-reason 
changing acts—are aimed at fulfilling a reflexive and other-directed intention.  But this 
cannot be done in the mind alone.  A command does not serve to make known some already 
completed mental act of command.  The behavioural act is not something that plays a merely 
epistemic role: such behaviour is constitutive of the act of command.  By analogy, consider  a 
promise.  A promise does not serve to make known some already completed promise made in 
the mind, it aims at effecting the promise.  A command does not seek to make known some 
already completed command in the mind. The same is true of consent.  Command, promise 
and consent are constitutively aimed at other people’s recognition of those acts as ones which 
are performed with a distinctive intention to change the normative situation.  One cannot 
coherently perform such an act whilst aiming to complete it in the mind alone.  This is not to 
claim that an act of consent is only made, or only changes others' reasons, when it is actually 
recognised by relevant others.  The problem for mentalism arises because of the kind of 
intention that robust reason-changing involves, not because it collapses the distinction 
between acts of consent and their recognition. 
But the mentalist can object at this point that we are conflating different kinds of reason.
16
  A 
mental act of consent changes other agents’ objective reasons (it sets aside a reason they have 
to refrain from acting in certain ways), but unless this change in objective reasons is made 
known to others, there is no change to the subjective reasons that others have.  Thus, in the 
“abandonment” example noted earlier, if R has set aside her rights in her mind, objective 
reasons have changed, even if nobody’s subjective reasons have done so.   
                                                          
16
 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this objection.  
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The first response to this is that this point seems to re-iterate the distinction between 
wronging and blameworthiness that we have already discussed.  The second, more important, 
response, is that this objection may seem to have some plausibility if we view acts of consent 
as a kind of Platonic moral bookkeeping exercise, where an agent, in her mind alone, brings 
about a change in "normative score" without the act of consent being aimed at being 
recognised by others as an act of that kind.  Now, in some  cases what we think, or decide, 
might make a difference to the moral status of others' actions even if no behavioural act is 
performed.  For example, suppose we hold that R is wronged by S if R says something deeply 
offensive to R's religious convictions.  Now suppose her convictions change but nobody else 
knows.  An act that would have wronged her, will now no longer do so, and this is because 
her state of mind has changed.  But this kind of mental change is not the exercise of a 
normative power, and does not involve anything like robust reason-changing.  In a similar 
way, simply deciding to forego one's objection is not yet to have performed an act of consent, 
just as merely deciding to order a subordinate, or deciding to promise, does  not (yet) give an 
order or make a promise.   
If we do adopt a distinction between subjective and objective reasons, as the objection above 
suggests, there is still a serious problem for mentalism when we consider the way that acts of 
consent change others’ reasons robustly.  When R consents to S’s actions, she is not merely 
aiming to change his subjective reasons, she is aiming to change his objective reasons.  
Suppose R sets aside her objection in her mind to S’s taking her bike.  On the mentalist 
proposal this mental act by itself changes the objective reasons that S has, even if it does not 
yet change S’s subjective reasons.  But what kind of change is this?  It looks like it has to be 
an instance of merely triggering change, rather than robust reason-changing.  Why?  Because 
robust reason-changing involves the distinctive kind of other-directed, reflexive, intention 
noted above.  It is unclear how simply setting aside one’s objection in one’s mind can be an 
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act aimed at fulfilling that kind of intention.  In order to sustain the objection, the mentalist 
would have to offer an alternative account of robust reason-changing, or explain why acts of 
consent (contrary to all appearances) do not change reasons robustly (they would also then 
have to explain the disanalogy between consent and other robust-reason-changing 
performatives like promise and command, or be saddled with the serious challenge of giving 
a mentalist account of those performatives too).  The distinction between objective and 
subjective reasons is independent of, and orthogonal to, the distinction between acts which 
must be aimed at fulfilling other-directed intentions (that is, robust-reason changing acts), and 
those that are not (a latter set which would include triggering reason-changes).   
Note that the central arguments offered here against mentalism also pertain to certain variants 
of the so-called "hybrid" theory of consent (Malm 1996).  The hybrid theorist holds that  a 
mental act alone is not sufficient for consent, but retains a commitment to the idea that public 
acts of consent signal or express consent.  But robust reason-changing is not a species of 
expressing or signalling some normatively salient act.  A public act of consent—be it verbal, 
or nonverbal, be it explicit, or explicitly prefixed with “I hereby”—does not signal a private 
act of consent, it effects the act of consent, just as R's order to attack does not signal a private 
mental act of command. 
6.  Conclusion 
We have been critically assessing mentalism: the view that normatively transformative acts of 
consent can be effected within the mind alone.  Initial objections to mentalism can be met by 
the mentalist with relative ease, especially if we accept the assumptions that it makes sense to 
think of an act of consent as something that can  be completed in the mind, and assume that 
the role of explicit behaviour is to communicate, or make known, such an act.  With these 
assumptions in place mentalism cannot be rebutted by the observation that consent is social, 
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directed at others, or gives reasons to others.  The mentalist can argue that these latter 
elements are secondary, practical, elements, which may make a difference to 
blameworthiness, but are not essential to normatively transformative consent.  Acts of 
consent are one thing, their communication and reason-giving nature another. 
The examples of "deceptive" consent raised a question mark about this kind of separation 
between consent and behaviour.  These examples were not meant to provide a conclusive 
case against mentalism, but, rather, were introduced to motivate an explanation of our anti-
mentalist intuitions in these examples. We now have that explanation.  In BOSS, R performs 
a robust reason-changing act, with the appropriate reflexive, recognition-directed intention.  
She intends by her utterance that S recognise this utterance and intending to permit S to ride 
the bike.  But R does not actually forego her objection, she (falsely) believes that the bike 
cannot be ridden so there will be no objection to forego.  In the case of SUITOR, the fact that 
R has consented—foregone her objection—to S's kiss in her mind is not yet to exercise her 
normative power.  She has done nothing that aims at changing the normative situation via an 
act aimed at fulfilling the appropriate kind of reflexive, recognition-directed, intention, 
indeed, she has made explicit her refusal and, given the authority of her normative power, 
that ought to be the last word.   
The mentalist cannot respond that we have conflated wronging with blameworthiness, for our 
robust reason-changing account accepts that there is a difference between performing a 
normatively transformative act of consent and its being known by others (e.g., our example 
above of the unread note consenting to the use of the motorbike).  Nor can the mentalist 
respond that we have conflated subjective and objective reasons, because the problem that 
arises for the mentalist theory is to account for robust-reason changing, which, in turn, 
requires acts aimed at fulfilling other-directed intentions. 
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The robust reason-changing theory of consent explains how it is that "consent" can be used in 
explicit performatives and why it can be prefixed, in some contexts, with "hereby".  On the 
mentalist account, it is very odd why anyone would say that they hereby consent—why are 
they not simply reporting their consent, rather than effecting it?  But the advantage of our 
robust-reason changing account is that it does not need to saddle itself with the 
"performative" label.  On our account normatively transformative acts of consent do not need 
to be effected with a consent verb (in whatever language), indeed, they do not need an act of 
speech at all.  Our theory can thus readily accommodate the fact that consent involves a very 
wide range of behaviours, verbal and nonverbal.  This meets the mentalist objection that 
'there is no canonical form of words or action that count as consent’ (Alexander 2014: 2); the 
same is true for commands and many other robust-reason changing acts  
In conclusion, our critical rejection of mentalism has allowed us to develop a clearer, and 
more defensible, conception of the fundamental nature of permissive consent (what is 
sometimes referred to as the ontology of consent).  The robust reason-changing account does 
not readily fit with extant positions on consent, but shares a good deal with the 
"performative" theory.  The robust reason-changing account raises plenty of questions, about 
why and when it is that we have this kind of robust reason-changing power (and how that 
power varies in different normative contexts).  It raises questions about how the power 
exercised—e.g., about how the normative scope of an act of consent is fixed—and about how 
the exercise of such a power might be undermined (e.g., by deception).  These are matters for 
another occasion.  If we are to make sense of consent it is important to start with a correct 
conception of what consent is.  Consent is not a mental act, nor is it the communication of a 
mental act, it is a behavioural act aimed at fulfilling a distinctive, reflexive and recognition-
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